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Abstract 
Robotic systems are developed to execute tasks with 
several types of risks associated. The possible damages 
that can affect both the working environment and the 
self-system lead us to consider that these systems are 
safety critical, i.e., systems where the strict 
management of safety aspects is vital. In this work we 
introduce our proposal for the consideration of safety 
related requirements and their consequent trace to the 
desired final system architecture. For this reason, this 
paper gives a procedure for the identification and 
specification of safety requirements based on a goal 
oriented framework. Moreover, in this work other 
approaches have been considered and integrated to 
deal with well known safety standard 
recommendations. By means of an industrial case 
study, we show how this proposal can be used to 
consider safety requirements in tele-operated robotic 
systems and, by extrapolation, in other critical 
domains. 
1.   Motivation 
Robotics systems are substantially different from 
other software applications because it is mandatory to 
consider aspects such as interaction with the 
environment, presence of perturbations, etc. Moreover, 
if their use has an important impact on persons and 
equipment when errors arise then safety aspects must 
be considered during their development. Besides the 
risks inherent to their use, work places are higher risk 
areas. Douglass [2] gives, among others, the following 
list of damage sources: errors in the execution of the 
control system (hardware and software), people who 
access to forbidden walking areas, human errors, 
broken mechanical parts, liberation of stored energy, 
and so on. 
Nowadays, when we analyze the development of 
tele-operated systems, we can observe that there is no 
well known integration of safety requirements within 
the process of requirements specification as whole, nor 
are there methodologies supporting it in an integrated 
way. To meet this deficiency, we have considered the 
goal oriented framework ATRIUM [16] for guiding 
the requirement engineering process. ATRIUM offers 
a methodology for defining both the requirement 
specification and the software architecture of the 
system. This framework has been extended for 
considering safety requirements by following the 
ANSI/RIA R15.06-1999 [1] standard. Furthermore, 
our proposal has been enriched both with the ideas by 
Lemos [11] for the division of operation mode of 
systems, and the patterns and heuristics given by 
Douglass [2] for the consideration of this kind of 
requirement. 
This work has been validated in the context of the 
EFTCoR project [4] funded by the European Union. 
This kind of system, by its nature, entails a greater 
probability of dangers than others. Thus a precise 
identification, specification and trace of safety 
requirements turn out essential.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: 
In Section 2, we present the conceptual framework 
considered. In Section 3, we describe the process of 
specifying a complete requirements specification, 
integrating safety requirements, by following a goal 
oriented approach. The case study is introduced in 
Section 4 by explaining the real situation where these 
ideas have been put into practice. Section 5 gives an 
example of pattern use for the materialization of safety 
requirements. Section 6 looks at some related work 
and finally the paper is concluded in Section 7 with 
future work. 
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2.   Conceptual Framework 
In order to clarify the following discussion, the 
main concepts used are defined in this section. Hence, 
it is mandatory to define which meaning of Safety 
requirement has been used from the set of definitions 
in the bibliography. ANSI/RIA R15.06-1999 standard, 
which this work is based on, defines Safety 
requirements as those to be satisfied for any industrial 
robotic system to assure the safety of personnel 
associated with its use. In this work, this definition has 
been extended, with Levesons’ ideas [15], by including 
damage or destruction of property or injury or damage 
to any living being, especially, human beings. 
When the behaviour of a system is being described, 
tasks to be provided by any system component, 
whether software or hardware, have also to be 
described. They mainly refer to that functionality 
expected from the system, as for instance, motions of 
any element of the robot, coordinated motions, use of 
tools, etc. The execution of these tasks is the potential 
source of damage or injuries the system can cause, so 
that the most serious risks for safety arise from 
deficiencies of functionality, reliability or usability as 
ISO/IEC 9126 standard [9] states. 
The early detection of Hazards is a challenge 
during the specification of Safety requirements. A 
hazard is any potential source of damage or injury to 
an entity of the system, from an operator to an entity of 
the environment or the self system. In this way, during 
the gathering and specification of Safety requirements, 
the analyst has to identify the likelihood of the system 
hazards and analyze them so as to determine which 
strategy is the most appropriate for their management. 
For this analysis, the risks related to each hazard have 
to be established, i.e., the damage or injury to any 
entity. 
These concepts indicate that although the process of 
gathering and identifying this kind of requirement is 
quite similar to that applied in other contexts, it does 
show some meaningful differences. Furthermore, the 
fact that tele-operated systems are Safety Critical 
emphasizes how important it is to provide the analyst 
with a both specific process and specific notation. 
A Goal describes why a system is being developed, 
or has been developed, from the point of view of the 
business, organization or the system itself. In order to 
identify it, both functional goals (expected services of 
the system) and non functional goals (quality of 
service, constraints on the design, etc.) should be 
determined. A Goal Model is built as a directed graph 
by means of a refinement from the systems goals (or 
concerns). This refinement lasts until goals have 
enough granularity and detail so as to be assigned to an 
agent (software or environment) so that they are 
verifiable within the system-to-be. This refinement 
process is performed by using AND/OR/XOR 
refinement relationships. In addition, 
operationalizations are also specified during the Goal 
Model definition. Operationalizations are the lowest 
level refinements introduced to describe the design 
alternatives associated to the requirements by means of 
contribution relationships. 
This approach offers two advantages that make it 
especially appropriate for analyzing the specification. 
The first advantage is related to its ability to specify 
and manage positive and negative interactions among 
goals, which allow the analyst to reason about different 
design alternatives and to validate the Goal Model by 
means of its animation. The second advantage is 
related to its capabilities concerning traceability from 
low-level details to high-level goals (concerns), which 
make it especially suitable to bridge the gap between 
architectural and requirements models. 
3.   Identifying and Specifying Safety 
Requirements 
Both ANSI/RIA R15.06-1999 standard and 
Douglass’ and Lemos‘ approaches have been 
integrated to establish a process for identification and 
specification of Safety Requirements in Tele-operated 
environments. The Goal Model of ATRIUM is the 
notation used during the process. This model exploits 
the standard ISO/IEC 9126 as a starting point to 
organize the requirements specification. 
The established process entails several steps. The 
first ones (I-II) are related to the behaviour 
specification of the system: 
I. To identify system operation modes, according to 
Lemos’ recommendations for control systems. 
These operation modes are specified as system 
goals and have a refinement relationship towards 
the characteristic ISO/IEC 9126 Suitability. Each 
goal is related to its child sub-goals by means of 
AND/OR/XOR refinement relationships. The 
relationship to be applied depends on whether all 
sub-goals, some of them or only one sub-goal, 
respectively, have to be included in the system to 
satisfy the parent goal. This intentional refinement 
is applied over and over again until goals have 
enough granularities to allow the identification of 
tasks.  
II. To identify Tasks (Ti) associated to each operation 
mode. In the Goal Model, these tasks are specified 
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as requirements which have an AND/OR/XOR 
refinement relationship towards their goal parent. 
In addition, it provides an improved visibility of 
which hardware/software components of the 
system are involved in which operation modes 
because of their traceability to operationalizations, 
i.e., scenarios which describe how these 
components interact to fulfil a requirement. 
Both the identification of operation modes and tasks 
provide the system behaviour specification. This 
identification must be performed before Safety 
requirements are identified, so that any likely injury or 
damage is caused when the system is performing these 
tasks. Once this view of the system has been 
established, Safety requirements are determined by 
using the ISO/IEC 9126 Safety category. Therefore, 
the following steps are added to the process: 
III. Determine Safety Goals of the system. For each 
identified task Ti its capacity to cause any damage 
is evaluated. If this happens, a Safety goal, Safe 
(Ti), will be specified so as to achieve safeguard 
Ti. This implicitly means a composition 
relationship between a Safety requirement Safe 
(Ti) and a Functional requirement Ti at the task 
level.
IV. Determine System Hazards. For each safety goal 
Safe (Ti) its related hazards are identified and 
specified as a sub-goal Manage (Hzj). An 
AND/OR/XOR relationship is established between 
Safe (Ti) and its set of hazards to be managed. The 
relation to apply depends on whether the whole set 
of hazards, some of them or only one, 
respectively, have to be managed to safeguard the 
task Ti. We have to bear in mind that the same 
hazard can be specified as refinement of several 
Safety goals.  
V. Identify Risks (Rk) associated to each pair Safe
(Ti)—Manage (Hzj). The associated risk Rk has to 
be identified, so that the strategy appropriate for 
the management of Hzj is selected. A Hazard can 
be related to several risks depending on which 
task is to be evaluated. Hence, according to the 
framework of traceability [13], the risk 
specification is represented by introducing a 
rationale associated to the refinement 
relationships between Safe (Ti)—Manage (Hzj). In 
addition, according to Douglass’ evaluation of 
risks, this rationale also entails some necessary 
information for the risk specification: 
identification of causes (software, hardware, 
human, …) which can result in a hazardous 
situation, reaction required for its management and 
maximum deadlines of exposure, detection and 
tolerance. 
VI.  Determine the Risk Reduction Category (RRC) to 
apply to each relation Safe (Ti)—Manage (Hzj),
taking into account its associated risks R1 … Rn.
With this aim, the following three attributes must 
be evaluated:  
a) Severity. Level of damage that an entity of the 
environment or the self system can suffer. The 
table which is provided by ANSI/RIA R15.06-
1999 for evaluation has been modified so as to 
deal with the widest sense of the term, i.e., 
including not only damage to the health or the 
environment but also to the self system. 
Therefore, the meanings associated to both S1 
and S2 categories are described now as follow: 
S2 Serious injury to the operator requiring 
more than first-aid. 
Damage of a system component which is 
irreplaceable both in time and cost. 
S1 Serious injury to the operator only 
requiring first-aid. 
Damage of a system component which is 
replaceable both in time and cost. 
b) Exposure.  Frequency of exposure to the 
hazard. ANSI/RIA R15.06-1999 defines two 
categories: E2 as frequent and E1 as infrequent.
c) Avoidance. Likelihood of avoiding the 
exposure to the hazard. ANSI/RIA R15.06-
1999 defines two categories: A2 as not likely 
and A1 as likely.
ANSI/RIA R15.06-1999 describes eight 
combinations of these values, which are specified 
in Table 1 as Risk Reduction Categories (RRCs) 
along with the recommended actions to manage the 
Hazard. Hence, a evaluation of the values 
(Severity, Avoidance, Exposure) is carried out on 
each pair Safe (Ti)—Manage (Hzj) and its risks Rk. 
According to the RRC an action has to be selected 
to eliminate, substitute, prevent, isolate or cease the 
Hzj. If different RRCs are applicable for the same 
pair Safe (Ti)—Manage (Hzj), the most severe will 
be the selected one. 
Once each pair Safe (Ti)—Manage (Hzj) has been 
dealt with along with its Strategy, it is mandatory to 
re-evaluate the full set of RRC for the Goal Model 
as the set of Hazards could have changed. This 
procedure must be repeated until all the hazards are 
considered “tolerable”, i.e., an acceptable risk level 
for the system. These hazards are to be considered 
residual risks of the system. 
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Table 1 Risk Reduction Categories
Exposure Avoidance Severity RRC Action on Hz 
S2 R1 Eliminate/Substitute 
A2 
S1 R2C Prevent/ 
S2 R2A Cease 
E2 
A1 
S1 R3A Isolate 
S2 R2B Prevent/Cease 
A2 
S1 R3A Isolate 
S2 R3B  
E1 
A1 
S1 R4 Warning/Training/Protect 
4.   Case Study 
This section illustrates how we have applied our 
proposal to gather the safety requirements of the 
industrial project EFTCoR. The aim of this project is to 
design a family of robots for performing ship hull 
maintenance operations such as coating removal, washing 
and re-painting. 
The identified robotic tele-operation platform is 
integrated by different subsystems (illustrated in Figure
1). The Robotic Devices Control Unit (RDCU) integrates 
all the required functionality to manage the EFTCoR. 
Cleaning Tools and Positioning Systems, both Primary 
and Secondary, are the mechanical components of the 
EFTCoR. Its architectural definition is highly relevant 
because of the constraints that have to be satisfied in 
order to allow a safe behavior of the system. 
During the elaboration of the specification, 6 operation 
modes were detected (step I): working, calibration,
learning, diagnosis and configuration (these four are
maintenance modes) and safe stop. For each operation 
mode the involved subsystems and associated task were 
defined (step II). Due to limited space, in this work we 
only include the Working Mode and the Primary 
Positioning sub-system of the EFTCoR system. 
Once the operation modes of the system were 
established, their safety requirements were detected. With 
this aim, those tasks to be safeguarded were specified as 
Safety goals, Safe (Ti), of the system (step III). Figure 2
(whose symbols are described in Table 5), shows a part of 
the Goal Model where tasks (Table 2) to be safeguarded 
are identified. The Goal Model for the EFTCoR, partially 
shown in Figure 2, has been made by means of 
MetaEdit+[10], a metaCase for domain-specific 
modelling. Each Safety Goal, Safe (Ti), was refined in 
Manage (Hzj) sub-goals by applying step IV. A summary 
of Hazards for the Primary Subsystem is shown in Table 
3.
Table 2. Summary of Tasks to safeguard 
Task Description 
T1 Motion of the arm joint  
T2 Motion of the joint on 
tracks  
T3 Stop of the primary motion 
Table 3. Summary of Hazards for the Primary 
Subsystem 
Task Description 
H1 Primary Positioning subsystem is moving and 
finds an obstacle on the rail. 
H2 End of range of the Primary joint is overrun 
(arm). 
H3 End of range of the Primary joint is overrun 
(on rails). 
H4  Joint of Secondary touches the hull of ship. 
H5 Primary (arms or tracks) does not stop. 
H6  Robot places the tool point out of the cleaning 
stereo-radio when the robot is in working 
mode.  
Figure 1. EFTCoR System 
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Applying step V, the risks (described in Table 4 and as 
comments in Figure 2) of each pair Safe (Ti) — Manage
(Hzj) were established. Along with their identification, a 
description of other information is also required for the 
later evaluation activity. For instance, R8 and R10 were 
established as likely risks for the pair Safe (H6)-Manage 
(T2) and, Sofware Error of the robot control as a possible 
cause of hazards; the realization of an Emergency Stop as
a possible reaction when hazard H6 appears; probability 
of occurrence medium; etc. 




Damage of the tool or any mechanical 
component of the Secondary Positioning 
subsystem. 
R2 Mechanical damage to the arm joint or joint on tracks. 
R3 Damage to the hull surface. 
R4 Damage to operator, primary or any object of the environment. 
R5 Mechanical damage of the primary with joint on tracks and overturned of the robot. 
R6 Mechanical damage to Primary Joint either on tracks or arm. 
R7 Damages to Secondary. 
R8 Damages to operator. 
R9 Mechanical damages. 
R10 Damage to objects of the environment. 
Table 5. Explanation for symbols used in Figure 
2
Symbol Goals on Figure 1 
Ti Safe (Ti) 
Hzj Manage (Hzj) 
As a result of step VI, several reduction categories 
were selected for use in each specific case. For instance, 
the evaluation of severity, exposure and avoidance was 
(S2, E2, A2) for the pair Safe (H6)-Manage (T2), taking 
into account the risks (R8, R10). By applying the RRCs 
shown in Table 1, the category R1 was established and 
eliminate was the selected action. Once the hazard H6 is 
eliminated the re-evaluation of the graph it is necessary in 
order to determine if the residual risks are tolerable for 
the system. 
5.   Safety Patterns For Operationalizations 
Table 6 describes the strategy for the entry R2A of the 
safeguard selection matrix (Table 1). This 
recommendation is not enough to develop concrete 
systems such as EFTCoR and in consequence more detail 
is needed in order to facilitate this process. Thus, we 
propose to establish a catalogue of patterns for the 
reduction or elimination of risks, classified by the ANSI 
RRC. These patterns, in a similar way to the proposal by 
Gamma [6], describe the solution to recurrent situations. 
In order to facilitate its comprehension, we give a 
concrete example of a pattern considered in the context of 
the EFTCoR system. 
Figure 2. Goal Model (Part of) 
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Table 6. Description of the ANSI Risk Reduction 
Category R2A 
R2A: Control reliable safety circuitry (based on 
hardware or software controller or firmware) 
The monitoring shall generate a stop signal if a 
fault is detected. A warning shall be provided if 
a hazard remains after cessation of motion  
Safe state shall be maintained until the fault is 
cleared. 
Common mode failures shall be taken into 
account. 
The single fault should be detected at time of 
failure. 
The primary positioning system (see Figure 3) has a 
height of twelve meters and a weight of twenty tons 
which make inevitable the movement of the robot without 
the consideration of safety requirements. The crane has in 
its central zone an articulated arm of two tons with a 
secondary positioning system at its end (an XYZ-table 
which includes a cleaning tool). It is indispensable that 
the system ensures a safe movement of the arm according 
to the received commands from the operator.  A detailed 
analysis of the hazard H5 ("the arm of the primary system 
does not stop") leads us to associate the following sources 
of error: 
Any sensor integrated with the motors that move the 
arm fails. 
The electrical power is off. 
The control unit does not run correctly (a hardware fail 
or a software error). 
Figure 3. Primary Positioning System with both 
arm joint (yellow) and joint on tracks (green) of 
the EFTCoR system  
The hazard H5 may imply the breakage of mechanical 
parts, the precipitation of components to the floor or 
damages to the human operator (R6, R7, R8). Taking into 
account the severity of the injury, the frequency of the 
exposure and the probability of avoidance, the RRC is 
R2A. Figure 4 shows the deployment partitioning of the 
system (using an extension of the standard UML 
notation), which accomplishes the R2A risk reduction 
factor for the hazard H5. The limitation of space in this 
paper does not allow us to give all the details related to 
the real implementation of the safeguard for this hazard 
(for instance, the concurrent state machines which we 
have used to model the concurrent monitoring of the 
system, etc.). Even so, the following description gives a 
good idea of the way in which the hazard has been 
considered: 
When a movement command is received, the Man 
Machine Interface (MMI) node forwards it 
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simultaneously both to the Control Unit node (which 
will process it) and to the redundant node dedicated to 
monitor possible hazards (Safety Control node). 
The control node reads from a sensor the current 
position of the joint and controls directly the 
functioning of the motor. The safety control node will 
stop the motor when it detects a malfunction of the 
motor. 
Just before the execution of any command, the control 
node sends a message to the monitoring node 
authorizing the starting of the movement. From this 
instant, the control unit sends to the monitoring node, 
by means of pulses (watch dog), the current value just 
read from the sensor. The monitoring node answers 
this tick with an acknowledgement signal (ack) which 
includes as a parameter the estimated value of the 
motor position. Both nodes compute the curve of the 
discrete positions that must be reached by the robot 
arm. This timed discrete calculus is done by taking 
into consideration the initial value of the sensor and 
the command to be executed. Any difference between 
the calculated values implies an anomaly in the 
function of the robot movement. When a node detects 
a discrepancy in this value with respect to the 
estimation of the position values, an emergency signal 
is generated. 
The different error conditions which could lead to a 
safe stopping of the robot in the previous example are the 
following: (1) Both the design and construction of the 
robot are done in such a way that, if a global fail of the 
system occurs then the robot will be mechanically fixed 
and returned to a safe mechanical state; (2) If any 
computing node does not work well (due to software or 
hardware errors) or the communication link fails then the 
other one will detect the discrepancy in the values. In this 
last case, it is essential that the control unit periodically 
reads the sensor data, although there is no current 
movement command in execution.  
6.   Related Works 
One of the most popular approaches to identify, 
evaluate and manage safety requirements is the technique 
named fault trees [8]. These trees provide a graphical 
notation and a formal support that facilitate the analysis 
from the perspective of the system fails and its origins. 
However, they do not offer a global framework for 
requirement specification as a discipline. From the point 
of view of requirement refinement, our proposal is 
analogous to the use of fault trees; however, in our work 
the analysis of safety requirements is integrated and 
derived from the set of functional requirements of the 
system.  
Letier et al [14] have proposed the use of KAOS for 
safety related requirement specification. They have 
introduced the concept of obstacle as a set of non 
desirable behaviours, the presence of those obstacles 
imply the obstruction in the fulfilment of the objective. At 
the same time, the negation of the obstacle generates the 
preconditions needed for the satisfaction of the 
requirements. The safety goals of the system being 
developed are formally specified by using temporal logic, 
and the obstacles (similar to hazards) are automatically 
obtained by the negation of the safety objectives and 
following the patterns given in their proposal [10]. 
However, the KAOS proposal does not provide a specific 
process for dealing with safety goals in the context of 
safety requirement specifications, nor does it consider 
factors such as severity, exposition time, etc, to be 
exploited during the analysis of the safety specification.  
7.   Conclusions 
In tele-operated systems the specification of safety 
requirements is a major challenge due to both the 
combination of hardware/software components and the 
presence of potential injury to people or equipment. In 
this work, we have introduced a unified proposal for 
requirement specification in this domain, which provides 
the integration and derivation of safety requirements with 
the remainder. We have adopted a goal oriented approach 
due to the obvious benefits for analysis and evaluation of 
alternatives. Moreover, the formal base of the approach 
allows the verification of several properties (not 
mentioned for space limitations). 
The consideration of very relevant standards and 
practical approaches (ANSI, Douglass and Leveson) for 
the domain of safety requirements has been the source to 
establish some methodological guidelines for safety 
requirement specification of tele-operated robotic 
systems. In these systems, it has been demonstrated that 
the use of catalogues and the perspective of traceability 
throughout the development process could improve the 
reuse of the knowledge based on a software product line 
approach [7]. In this paper, we have illustrated the 
application of these ideas in the scope of the EFTCoR 
research project.  
Currently, we have two open issues: The first is related 
to the application of our proposal into other projects; and, 
the second is devoted to the extension of MetaEdit+ for 
the development of analysis tools, which help, for 
instance, to automatically determine the RRCs. 
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